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Abstract
The paper studies how to release data about a criti-
cal infrastructure network (e.g., a power network or
a transportation network) without disclosing sensi-
tive information that can be exploited by malevo-
lent agents, while preserving the realism of the net-
work. It proposes a novel obfuscation mechanism
that combines several privacy-preserving building
blocks with a bi-level optimization model to signif-
icantly improve accuracy. The obfuscation is evalu-
ated for both realism and privacy properties on real
energy and transportation networks. Experimental
results show the obfuscation mechanism substan-
tially reduces the potential damage of an attack ex-
ploiting the released data to harm the real network.
1 Introduction
Critical Infrastructure Networks (CINs), such as electrical
power grids and public transportation networks, rely on the
tight interaction of cyber and physical components. They
play crucial roles in ensuring social and economic stability,
and their operations require advanced machine-learning and
optimization algorithms. For instance, power network opera-
tions perform a power flow computation every few minutes.
Research on CINs is highly dependent on the availability
of realistic test cases. However, the release of such datasets
is challenging due to privacy and national security concerns.
For instance, the electrical load of an industrial customer may
indirectly reveal sensitive information on its production lev-
els and strategic investments. Similarly, the ability to link the
physical and cyber locations of power generators can be used
to launch coordinated attacks on cyber-physical facilities, sig-
nificantly damaging the targeted network.
To mitigate these concerns, this paper develops an obfusca-
tion mechanism based on Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwork
et al., 2006], a robust framework that bounds the privacy
risks associated with answering sensitive queries or releas-
ing datasets. A DP algorithm introduces carefully calibrated
noise to the data to prevent the disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation. It is immune to linkage attacks–attacks in which one
exploits auxiliary data to expose sensitive information.
However, DP faces significant challenges when the result-
ing privacy-preserving datasets are used as inputs to complex
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Figure 1: The POCIN Framework
optimization algorithms on CINs. For instance, direct appli-
cations of DP may impact the realism of the original dataset
or produce networks that do not admit feasible solutions for
the problem of interest [Fioretto and Van Hentenryck, 2018].
The paper addresses this gap by introducing a Privacy-
preserving Obfuscation mechanism for CINs (POCINs),
sketched in Figure 1. POCIN takes as input a CIN and ex-
ecutes three phases to (1) obfuscate the sensitive location of
network elements, (2) hide sensitive values, and (3) ensure
the satisfaction of important global properties of the CIN and
the problem of interest, through the use of optimization.
The paper makes the following contributions: (1) It pro-
poses POCIN, a novel privacy-preserving data release scheme
that protects parameters and locations of network elements;
(2) POCIN uses a novel bi-level optimization approach to
preserve salient properties of the released data and solves it
with either exact or approximated methods; and (3) It applies
POCIN to two real CINs from energy and transportation net-
works. The paper shows that POCIN ensures strong privacy
guarantees and that, on the considered CINs, the damage in-
flicted on the real network, when the attacker exploits the ob-
fuscated data, converges to that of a random uninformed at-
tack as the privacy requirements increase.
2 Preliminaries: Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy (DP) is a framework used to protect the
privacy of individuals in a dataset. This notion has emerged
as the de-facto standard for privacy protection. A randomized
mechanism M : D ÑR with domain D and range R is -
differential private if, for any output response O Ď R and
any two neighboring inputs D,D1 P D differing in at most
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one individual (written D „ D1),
PrrMpDq P Os ď exppqPrrMpD1q P Os, (1)
where the probability is calculated over the coin tosses ofM.
The parameter ą0 is the privacy loss of the algorithm, with
values close to 0 denoting strong privacy. DP satisfies several
important properties, including composability, which ensures
that a combination of differentially private algorithms pre-
serve differential privacy, and immunity to post-processing,
which ensures that privacy guarantees are preserved by arbi-
trary post-processing steps [Dwork and Roth, 2013].
In private data analysis settings, users interact with datasets
by issuing queries. A (numeric) query is a function from
a data set D P D to a result set R Ď Rd. A query Q
can be made differentially private by injecting random noise
to its output. The amount of noise depends on the sensi-
tivity of the query, denoted by ∆Q and defined as ∆Q “
maxD„D1 }QpDq ´QpD1q}1 . In other words, the sensitiv-
ity of a query is the maximum l1-distance between the query
outputs of any two neighboring dataset D and D1.
While the classical DP notion protects individuals from
participating into a dataset, many applications involve com-
ponents whose presence is public information. However,
their values and (cyber) locations are highly sensitive, as they
may reveal, for instance, how much power a generator is pro-
ducing and where it is located, or the most congested seg-
ments in transportation or logistics network. Therefore the
privacy goal of data curators is to protect observed values and
locations associated with these components.
The concept of indistinguishability was introduced by
Andre´s et al. [2013] to protect user locations in the Euclidean
plane and then generalized in [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013;
Koufogiannis et al., 2015] to arbitrary metric spaces. Con-
sider a dataset D to which n individuals contribute their data
xi and α ą 0. An adjacency relation that captures the data
variation of a single individual is defined as:
D „α D1 ô Di : dpxi, x1iq ď α^ @j ‰ i : dpxj , x1jq “ 0
where d is a distance function on D . Such adjacency def-
inition is useful to hide individual participation up to some
quantity α, or a location within a radius α. Given  ą
0, α ą 0, a randomized mechanism M : D Ñ R with
domain D and range R is α-indistinguishable -DP (p, α)-
indistinguishable for short) if, for any event O Ď R and any
pair D „α D1, (D,D1 P D), Equation (1) holds.
3 The CIN Obfuscation Problem
Problem Setting Consider a dataset pN , Eq describing
some critical infrastructure network where N P Rnˆp and
E P Rmˆq describe the set of n nodes and m edges of the
network, together with their attributes. The dataset pN , Eq is
referred to as CIN description. An element ni of N is a p-
dimensional vector describing the attribute values associated
with node i and an element eij of E , is a q-dimensional vec-
tor describing the attribute values associated with edge pi, jq
between nodes i and j. Furthermore, consider an optimiza-
tion problem P that takes as input a CIN description, denoted
200 MW 140 MW
360 MW40 MW
-400 MW
-340 MW
Figure 2: An example CIN with four nodes (power generators). The
highlighted node is one being compromised by an attacker.
with G for notational clarity:
O˚pGq “ min
x
Opx,Gq
s.t. gipx,Gq ď 0 @i P rks, (2)
where xPRl is a vector of decision variables, O is the objec-
tive function of P , and gi (iPrks) are the problem constraints.
To illustrate these concepts, consider the CIN in Figure 2,
representing a simplified power network. The nodes describe
the network generators and loads (represented as cities in the
figure) with values denoting the amount of power being in-
jected into, or withdrawn from, the power grid. The edges
represent the transmission lines to carry power from genera-
tors to loads. The optimization problem P may be the opti-
mal power flow (OPF) that amounts to finding the most cost-
effective generator dispatch to serve the load demands while
satisfying the physical constraints of the network. The data
curator desires to release a CIN description pN˜ , E˜q that ob-
fuscates the location and value of some sensitive network el-
ements, e.g., the locations and capacities of generators. The
curator also wants to ensure that the OPFs on the released and
original CINs behave similarly (e.g., are feasible and have
similar costs) so that the released data is of high fidelity.
For notational simplicity, this paper focuses on obfuscating
sensitive nodes of a CIN where each node ni P N is a pair
p`i, viq P N ˆ R, describing its location and salient param-
eter. The n-dimensional vectors of locations and values are
denoted by ` and v andG is used to denote a CIN description.
Attack Model The paper considers an attack model A in
which a malicious agent can disrupt up to b elements (called
attack budget) to damage the network. Such action produces
a new damaged network Ga “ ApGq with Ga Ď G. For in-
stance, Figure 2 highlights in red the generators affected by an
attack with a budget b “ 1, while Ga is shown in black. The
paper further assumes that the attacker has full knowledge of
the network topology and is capable of solving problem P
(e.g., to find the generators with highest dispatch) and assess-
ing the damages resulting from an attack. The damage of
the attacker is measured using the objective value difference
O˚pGaq ´ O˚pGq for problem P . For simplicity, the pa-
per focuses on ranking attacks, i.e., attacks that disrupt the b
highest-ranked network elements when their values are sorted
according to an ordering ă (e.g., the most dispatched gener-
ators), and evaluates the released data against such attacks.
The CIN Obfuscation Problem This paper uses α-
indistinguishability to obfuscate the values and locations of
nodes. For a given α` ą 0, the relation „`Ď N2 captures
indistinguishability between node positions in the network,
using a distance d` defined as a function of the minimum
number of nodes separating two nodes. Similarly, for a given
αv ą 0 and distance function dv , relation „vĎ R2 captures
the indistinguishability between node values. These neigh-
boring relations can be combined into a new relation„`v that
captures indistinguishability for both values and locations.
Two CIN descriptions G “ p`,vq,G1 “ p`1,v1q P N ˆ R
are location and value indistinguishable if and only if
G „`v G1 ô ` „` `1 _ v „v v1. (3)
A randomized mechanismM is p, α`, αvq-indistinguishable
if, for any pair of „`v-adjacent datasets, Equation (1) holds.
The design of obfuscation mechanisms for CIN descrip-
tions should satisfy three desiderata, formalized through the
Privacy-preserving Obfuscation for CIN (POCIN) problem:
Definition1 Given a CIN description G, a problem P , and
positive real values αv, α`, β and , the POCIN problem pro-
duces an obfuscated CIN description G˜ “ p ˜`, v˜q such that:
1. Privacy: G˜ satisfies p, α`, αvq-indistinguishability.
2. Fidelity: G˜ admits a candidate solution x¯ that (i) satisfies
the constraints gipx¯, G˜q of P and (ii) is β-faithful to the
P’s objective, i.e., |Opx¯,G˜q´O
˚pGq|
O˚pGq ď β.
3. Robustness: G˜ minimizes |O˚pGq´O˚pApG˜qq|, i.e., the
damage inflicted by attack A.
4 The POCIN Mechanism
The POCIN mechanism is divided in three phases, as illus-
trated in Figure 1:
1. The location obfuscation phase produces a new location
indistinguishable CIN G` “ p ˜`,vq from the original G.
2. The value obfuscation phase takes G` as input and pro-
duces a new value indistinguishable CIN G˜ “ p ˜`, v˜q.
3. The fidelity restoration phase produces a new CIN descrip-
tion 9G “ p ˜`, 9vq that satisfies the problem constraints and
is faithful to its objective.
Phase 1: Location Obfuscation
The first phase provides location indistinguishability. The
idea is to shuffle the node locations using an instance of the
Exponential Mechanism [McSherry and Talwar, 2007]. Such
mechanism releases a privacy-preserving answer to a query
by sampling from its output discrete space O. The sampling
probability is determined by a utility function u : pD ˆOq Ñ
R that assigns a score to each output o P O.
Theorem1 (Exponential Mechanism) Let u :pD ˆOqÑR
with sensitivity ∆u“maxoPO maxD„D1 |upD, oq´upD1, oq|.
The exponential mechanism that outputs o with probability
Prro is selected s9 exp `upD, oq{2∆u˘ satisfies ´DP.
POCIN uses a privacy-preserving shuffling function that
maps each node i with location `i to a new location ˜`i as:
˜`
i Ð `j with Pr9 exp
ˆ
 d`p`i, `jq
2α`
˙
(4)
0.071
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Figure 3: Probabilities of location obfuscations (α`““1.0).
where `j is the location of a node j. This is an application
of the Exponential mechanism with ∆u being the sensitivity
of distance function d`. Since two different locations may be
mapped to the same location, POCIN solves an assignment
problem so that each node i is mapped to a unique location.
Corollary1 Given α` ą 0, Phase 1 of POCIN achieves α`-
location-indistinguishability.
Figure 3 illustrates the intuition underlying the mechanism: It
displays the probabilities of moving the central node to a spe-
cific location. For a sufficiently large α`, an attacker is pro-
vided with no useful location information. Of course, there is
a tradeoff between α` and the fidelity of the network, which
is addressed in Phase 3.
Phase 2: Value Obfuscation
The second phase of POCIN takes as input G` “ p˜`,vq and
constructs a privacy-preserving answer v˜ for the node values
v using the Laplace mechanism.
Theorem2 (Laplace Mechanism) Let Q be a numeric
query that maps datasets to Rd. The Laplace mechanism that
outputs QpDq ` z, where z P Rd is drawn from the Laplace
distribution Lapp∆Q{qd, achieves -DP.
In the above, Lappλq denotes the Laplace distribution with
0 mean and scale λ, and Lappλqd denotes the i.i.d. Laplace
distribution over d dimensions with parameter λ. The
Laplace mechanism with parameter λ “ α{ satisfies α-
indistinguishability [Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013]. As a re-
sult, the privacy-preserving values v˜ of the CIN description
are obtained as follows:
v˜ “ v ` Lappαv{qn. (5)
The Laplace mechanism has been shown to be optimal: it
minimizes the mean-squared error for identity queries with
respect to the L1-norm [Koufogiannis et al., 2015].
Corollary2 Given αv ą 0, Phase 2 of POCIN achieves αv-
value-indistinguishability.
Phase 2 generates a CIN description G˜ “ p ˜`, v˜q obfuscating
locations and values of the original network G. As a result,
Gv satisfies condition (1) of the CIN obfuscation problem.
Phase 3: Fidelity Restoration
The noise introduced by Phases 1 and 2 may significantly al-
ter the structure of the data and the solutions to ProblemP . To
restore the fidelity of the network, POCIN leverages the post-
processing immunity of DP and uses a bi-level optimization
problem to redistribute the noise introduced in the previous
phases. The primary decision variables of the problem are the
vector 9v “ p 9v1, . . . , 9vnq that represents the post-processed
node values after the noise redistribution.
PBL“minp 9v,xq} 9v ´ v˜}2 (b1)
s.t.: |Opx˚, 9vq ´O˚| ď β (b2)
x˚“argminx Opx, 9vq
s.t. gipx, 9vq ď 0 @i P rks (b3)
Figure 4: The bi-level optimization of the Fidelity Restoration.
The problem, called PBL, is shown in Figure 4. It searches
for a vector 9v for which problem P has an optimal solution
x˚ and whose objective value is close to the original opti-
mum O˚ (assumed to be public information). Moreover, the
vector 9v must be as close as possible to obfuscated vector v˜,
which is ensured by objective (b1). Constraint (b3) ensures
that x˚ is an optimal solution to problem O˚p 9G “ p ˜`, 9vqq,
and Constraint (b2) ensures the fidelity of the objective.
Theorem3 POCIN is p, αp, αvq-indistinguishable.
Theorem4 The error induced by POCIN on the CIN node
values is bounded by the inequality: } 9v ´ v}2 ď 2}v˜ ´ v}2.
Note that POCIN does not explicitly minimize the damages
inflicted by an attack on the critical infrastructure network.
Indeed, simply evaluating the damage of an attack requires
access to the real network G, which would violate privacy.
However, the shuffling mechanism indirectly addresses this
issue. Intuitively, for a sufficiently large α` in the location
obfuscation, the probability of choosing the most dispatched
generator with a single attack will be close to 1n .
5 Solving the Fidelity Restoration Model
PBL is a bi-level problem and bi-level programming is known
to be strongly NP-hard [Hansen et al., 1992]: Even evaluating
a solution for optimality is NP-hard [Vicente et al., 1994].
This paper explores two avenues to solve or approximate PBL.
When the subproblem (b3) is convex, it can be replaced
by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, producing a
single-level model. Moreover, when the subproblem is lin-
ear, the resulting subproblem is a MIP model, which is the
case in our transportation case study. The subproblem can
also be replaced by the relaxation of PBL shown in Figure 5.
This relaxation ensures that 9G has a feasible solution whose
value is close to the original objective. However, it does not
constrain the optimal solution which will be a lower bound to
Opx˚, 9vq. This relaxation is used in the power network case
study and also satisfies Theorem 4. When the subproblem is
convex, it is possible to strengthen Theorem 4 using the ex-
istence of a solution (vector v), the optimality of 9v, and the
angle property of a projection on a convex set.
Theorem5 When PCL is used for fidelity restoration and is
convex, the error induced by POCIN on the CIN node values
is bounded by the inequality: } 9v ´ v}2 ď }v˜ ´ v}2.
Other methods to solve bi-level problems include de-
scent methods [Kolstad and Lasdon, 1990], penalty function
methods [Aiyoshi and Shimizu, 1984], and evolutionary ap-
proaches [Mathieu et al., 1994]. The reader can consult
[Sinha et al., 2018] for an extensive review on the topic.
PCL“minp 9v,xq} 9v ´ v˜}2 (n1)
s.t.: |Opx, 9vq ´O˚| ď β (n2)
gipx, 9vq ď 0 @i P rks (n3)
Figure 5: The Relaxation of PBL.
α
Network instance 1 3 5 7 10
nesta case14 ieee 6 6 6 6 6
nesta case30 ieee 0 0 0 0 0
nesta case57 ieee 12 10 6 12 12
nesta case118 ieee 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Feasibility Statistics before Phase 3 (in percentage).
6 Experimental Results
This section presents experimental results on two case stud-
ies: power network and traffic obfuscation problems.
6.1 Power Network Obfuscation Problem
This scenario considers a transmission operator who would
like to release a description of its network to stimulate re-
search but is worried that malicious actors could use it to de-
sign a cyber-attack targeting the generators that would cause
maximum damage. The operator seeks to obfuscate the lo-
cations and maximum capacities of its generators while pre-
serving the realism of the network description. The experi-
ments were performed on a variety of benchmarks from the
NESTA library [Coffrin et al., 2014]. The results analyze the
dispatch values produced by POCIN and determine how well
the obfuscated networks sustain an attack. For brevity, the
results are highlighted on the IEEE 118 bus test case. The
experiments use a privacy loss  of 1.0, and vary the indistin-
guishability levels αl from 1% to 10% of the network diame-
ter dpGq, and the faithfulness level β in t10´2, 10´1u, while
αv is fixed to 0.1 p.u. « 10 MW. The model was implemented
using the Julia package PowerModels.jl with IPOPT [Coffrin
et al., 2018] for solving the nonlinear AC power flow models.
POCIN takes less than 1 minute to produce the obfuscated
networks.
Dispatch & Cost Analysis The section studies the privacy
and realism of the obfuscated networks produced by POCIN.
Figure 6a shows the active dispatch values of all generators in
the obfuscated network and compares them with their associ-
ated values in the original network. The left plot compares
the dispatch for each generator, while the right plot compares
the generation on each bus. Note that POCIN only swaps
generator locations and do not assign generators to arbitrary
buses. Not surprisingly, the dispatch differences are more
pronounced as the indistinguishability level increases. More
importantly, the dispatch values can no longer be used to dis-
tinguish generators and/or buses.
Table 1 reports the success rate of obtaining a feasible AC
power flow after Phase 2 on various benchmarks over 50 runs.
Without Phase 3, the optimization problem P is infeasible
in most or all runs for all test cases. These results highlight
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(a) Active dispatch between original and obfuscated networks with  “ 1.0, β “ 0.01,
αl “ α%ˆ dpGq, αv “ 0.1. Left: Generator active generation. Right: Bus active injection.
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(b) AC optimal dispatch costs differences
(in %) between original and obfuscated
networks, with β “ 0.1
Figure 6: (IEEE 118 bus) Dispatch & Cost Analysis
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Figure 7: Ancillary service costs for the attack type on the IEEE-57
(left) and IEEE-118 (right) Networks pβ “ 0.1q.
the critical role of Phase 3 of POCIN. Figure 6b shows the
difference, in percentage, between the dispatch costs of the
obfuscated and original networks for increasing the indistin-
guishability levels αl : αl “ α%ˆ dpGq. It reports the mean
and standard deviation (shown with black, solid, lines) over
50 runs. The results indicate that obfuscated networks are
largely within the faithfulness requirement and provide the
necessary fidelity for Problem P on the obfuscated network.
Attack Simulation It remains to study how an attacker may
leverage the obfuscated network to damage the original CIN.
The attacker is given an attack budget b denoting the percent-
age of generators that can be damaged. To assess the benefits
of POCIN, three type of attacks are compared (where k de-
note the number of generators that makes up b%).
1. Random Attack: k generators are randomly selected.
2. Obfuscated Attack: The attacker chooses the k generators
with the largest dispatches in 9G.
3. Fully-Informed Attack: The attacker chooses the k gener-
ators with the largest dispatches in G.
The experiments assume estimated ancillary service costs of
$10/MWh to serve the load that cannot be provided by the re-
maining generators. Figure 7 shows the costs for each attack
type at varying of the attack budget b P t10, 20, 30u and the
indistinguishability value α P t1.0, 10.0u, αl “ α% ˆ dpGq
on the IEEE-57 and IEEE-118 benchmarks with faithfulness
value β and αv both set to 0.1. The results average 50 sim-
ulations for each combination of parameters. The random
attacks are used as a baseline to assess the damage inflicted
by an uninformed attacker. Not surprisingly, they result in
the lowest costs in each setting. In contrast, fully-informed
attacks produce the largest damages on the networks with in-
creasing ancillary costs as the attack budget increases. The
results for the obfuscated attacks are particularly interest-
ing: The obfuscation significantly reduces the power of an
attacker. Remarkably, as the location indistinguishability val-
ues increase, the inflicted damages decrease and converge to
that of random attacks. Larger indistinguishability implies
more noise, and thus a higher chance for an attacker to dam-
age less important generators. Note however that the mecha-
nism still preserves the desired network fidelity.
6.2 Traffic Network Obfuscation Problem
The scenario involves a city that would like to release its traf-
fic data, but is concerned about a cyber-attack on its traffic
control system. The city aims at releasing an obfuscated ver-
sion of the data that would preserve the trip durations of its
commuters and would minimize the damage of a cyber-attack
on its traffic controllers regulating traffic flows on the road
segments. The case study involves the traffic network of the
city of Ann Arbor, MI and 8,000 real trips from an origin O
to a destination D (O-D pairs). For simplicity, the travel times
on an edge e are given by a linear combination de ` γte of
the distance de and the traffic te, but the results generalize
naturally to more complex models. POCIN obfuscates the lo-
cation of the edges and their transit data, the distance and the
network being public information. Problem P is character-
ized by solving a shortest path for each commuter from her
origin to her destination, using historical traffic data. Since
the shortest path problem is totally unimodular, the bi-level
program PBL of POCIN can be reformulated as a MIP, and
thus the problem can be solved exactly. The experiments use
a privacy loss of  “ 1.0, vary the indistinguishability level αl
from 1% to 25% of the number of nodes and select the faith-
fulness level β of 0.1. The implementation takes less than 20
minutes to generate the obfuscated networks.
Traffic Weights & Travel Costs The first experiments con-
cern the privacy and realism of the obfuscated network pro-
duced by POCIN. Figure 8 shows the travel times on all the
roads in the obfuscated and original networks. As the indis-
tinguishability levels increase, the networks become signif-
icantly different. Figure 9 shows the shortest paths cost of
15 O-D pairs in the obfuscated and original networks. Yel-
low/’+’ dots are travel costs before Phase 3 and blue dots are
the travel costs of POCIN. The results show that POCIN pre-
serves the shortest paths costs with high fidelity and that the
fidelity restoration step brings significant benefits.
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Figure 8: Traffic weights on all the roads between original and ob-
fuscated networks with faithfulness parameters β “ 0.1.
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Figure 9: Travel costs of 15 trips between original and obfuscated
networks with faithfulness parameters β “ 0.1.
Attack Simulation The second set of results concerns the
obfuscation capability to mitigate the damage of an attack. A
malicious agent targets the traffic controllers of various road
segments to increase the total travel costs of all O-D pairs.
Figure 10 shows the average increases (in %) of the travel
costs for each attack strategy, at various attack budgets con-
sisting of k P t10, 20, 50u roads, indistinguishability value α,
and with faithfulness value β “ 0.1. Larger values of β attain
similar results. Results are averages over 50 simulations for
each combination of parameters. The results show that ran-
dom attacks are completely ineffective, while fully-informed
attacks increase travel times substantially. In contrast, the ob-
fuscation dramatically decreases the damage. When the in-
distinguishability level increases, the obfuscation eliminates
the damage for attack budgets targeting 10 roads and only
increases the travel times by less than 20% on larger attacks.
7 Related Work
The release of differentially private datasets that protects the
value of the data is a challenging task that has been studied
by several authors. Often the released data is generated from
a data synopsis in the form of a noisy histogram [Li et al.,
2014; Qardaji et al., 2014; Fioretto et al., 2018]. Protect-
ing locations privacy typically uses the framework of geo-
indistinguishability Andre´s et al. [2013], in which locations
are made indistinguishable in the Euclidean plane.
The release of differentially private networks has also
been studied in the literature: It primarily focuses on so-
cial networks [Proserpio et al., 2014; Blocki et al., 2013;
Kasiviswanathan et al., 2013]. These methods focus on either
protecting the privacy of the node or the edge and ensure that
the output distribution does not change significantly when a
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Figure 10: Average increase on travel times (in %) of all O-D pairs
with faithfulness parameters β “ 0.1.
node (resp. edge) and all its adjacent edges (resp. nodes) are
added to, or removed from, the graph. The goal of these meth-
ods is not to preserve the original network topology. In con-
trast to these approaches, POCIN focuses on the release of
privacy-preserving network data that protects locations and
values of the network components while preserving the net-
work topology and fidelity. As shown by the experimental re-
sults, this places additional requirements on the mechanism,
including the need for POCIN to use optimization to redis-
tribute the noise and ensure that the data release admits a re-
alistic solution to the optimization problem.
The evaluation of privacy-preserving techniques with re-
spect to malicious attacks is also a novel contribution of this
paper. Traditional research on attack detection and preven-
tion on cyber-physical systems is not concerned with privacy
and data release. For instance Ghafouri et al. [2018] uses re-
gression to detect anomalous sensor readings and Junejo and
Goh [2016] focuses on predicting attacks observing real and
simulated data. Finally, bi-level problems have been used in
security applications of AI [Pita et al., 2009; Jain et al., 2011;
Nguyen et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2017].
8 Conclusions
This paper presented a privacy-preserving scheme for the re-
lease of Critical Infrastructure Networks (CINs). The pro-
posed Privacy-preserving Obfuscation mechanism for CIN
(POCIN) obfuscates values and locations of sensitive network
elements combining several differential privacy mechanisms
with a bi-level optimization problem. It does so without al-
tering the CIN topology and ensuring that the released ob-
fuscated network preserves the fundamental properties of an
optimization problem of interest.
The paper proposes exact and relaxation solutions for solv-
ing the bi-level optimization problems. The POCIN mecha-
nism was tested on realistic test cases for the power grid and
transportation system. The results show that POCIN is effec-
tive in obfuscating values and locations of the network param-
eters. Importantly, the result also illustrates the effectiveness
of POCIN to deceive malicious agents that exploit the data
release to produce as much damage as possible to the CIN.
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A Missing Proofs
First, we review some important properties of DP.
Composability ensures that a combination of differentially
private algorithms preserve differential privacy.
Theorem6 (Parallel Composition) Let D1 and D2 be dis-
joint subsets of D and A be an -DP algorithm. Computing
ApD XD1q and ApD XD2q satisfies -DP.
Post-processing immunity ensures that privacy guarantees
are preserved by arbitrary post-processing steps.
Theorem7 (Post-Processing Immunity) Let A be an -DP
algorithm and g an arbitrary mapping from the set of possible
outputs O to an arbitrary set. Then, g ˝A is -DP.
Corollary1 Given α` ą 0, Phase 1 of POCIN achieves α`-
location-indistinguishability.
Proof. Observe that the Location Obfuscation phase
(Phase 1) combines the exponential mechanism with a post-
processing step. Therefore, the result follows by Theorem
??, parallel composition (Theorem 6), and post-processing
immunity of differential privacy (Theorem 7). l
Corollary2 Given αv ą 0, Phase 2 of POCIN achieves αv-
value-indistinguishability.
Proof. Observe that the Value Obfuscation phase (Phase
2) is an application of the Laplace Mechanism with scaling
factor αv{ (Equation (4): main article). The result follows
from Theorem 2 and by observing that the Laplace Mecha-
nism with parameter α{ achieves p, αq-indistinguishability
[Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013]. l
Theorem3 POCIN is p, αp, αvq-indistinguishable.
Proof. From Corollaries 1 and 2 the application of Phase
1 and Phase 2 of POCIN achieves p, α`q-indistinguishability
for locations and p, αvq-indistinguishability for values, re-
spectively. Therefore, from Equation (3) (main article) the
Phase 1 and 2 of POCIN are location and value indistin-
guishable and achieve p, αp, αvq-indistinguishability. Fi-
nally, Phase 3 uses exclusively differentially private outputs
and public information. Therefore the result follows from
post-processing immunity of differential privacy (Theorem
7). l
The proof of the next theorem is similar to the proof of
(Theorem 5) in [Fioretto and Van Hentenryck, 2018].
Theorem4 The error induced by POCIN on the CIN node
values is bounded by the inequality: } 9v˚´v}2 ď 2}v˜´v}2.
where 9v˚ is the optimal solution to problem PBL.
Proof. The results follows from the fact that v is feasible for
the lower-level problem, the optimality of 9v˚ for PBL, and the
triangle inequality on norms. l
Theorem5 When PCL is used for fidelity restoration and is
convex, the error induced by POCIN on the CIN node values
is bounded by the inequality:
} 9v˚ ´ v}2 ď }v˜ ´ v}2.
where 9v˚ is the solution to the problem PCL.
Proof. Let CP P Rn be the feasible set of PCL, i.e.,
CP “ tv|Dx such that pn2q ´ pn3q holdu. By definition, CP
is closed, convex, and non-empty, since v is a feasible solu-
tion. Since v is the original vector, then v P CP . The addition
of noise to v produces a new vector v˜ P Rn that may or may
not satisfy the problem constraints.
• Case 1: v˜ P CP . That is, v˜ satisfies the constraints of
PCL. The minimizer for PCL is thus the vector 9v˚ “ v˜
with objective value 0. Therefore:
} 9v˚ ´ v}2 “ }v˜ ´ v}2.
• Case 2: v˜ R CP , i.e., v˜ lies outside the feasible region
CP . Problem PCL can be seen as a projection problem
onto a convex set, i.e.,
ProjCppxq “ argmin
vPCp
}x´ v}2.
The variational characterization of projection implies
that the solution 9v˚ satisfies xv ´ 9v˚, v˜ ´ 9v˚y ď 0 and
the result follows from the triangle inequality on norms.
l
